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ABSTRACT 
The removal of barriers to trade and mobility is usually promoted as it allows for greater 
division of labor and, thereby, for improved economic welfare. Recent theory, however, 
suggests that the integration of markets might have serious consequences for the regional 
allocation of economic activity. In particular, economies of scale and distance to the market 
are said to put the periphery at a disadvantage, thus promoting regional divergence rather 
than convergence in per capita incomes. By focussing on European economic integration 
and the experience of Spain joining the EU, the paper shows that this view frequently stems 
from a competitiveness approach to economic integration which need not hold on an 
aggregate level. 
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I. THE CONCERN ABOUT THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Ahhough in principle seen as welfare enhancing, there have always been considerable doubts 
whether economic integration benefits all members of the "club". Instead. it is often argued, 
it might well be that economic activity gravitates towards centers in the course of opening 
up national markets, leaving some coootries at the periphery of economic activity. For, if 
markets become more integrated, economies of scale can be exploited far better by 
concentrating production locally. Looking at economies of scale and the size of the market, 
the prospects of catching up for countries that are backward in relative tenns seem therefore 
to be rather disappointing. Instead of being ironed out, already existing differences might 
even be reinforced in the course of economic integration. I 
Does economic integration promote a regional divergence in per capita incomes instead 
of strengthening the centripetal forces as traditional theory along Heckscher/Ohlin lines 
suggests? In particular, is there good reason to assume that economies of scale and distance 
to the market put the periphery of the European Union at a locational disadvantage in terms 
of price and cost competitiveness as compared to the center? As the paper shows, the notion 
that the core-periphery pattern is necessarily reinforced the more national markets are 
opened to international competition is frequently based on a competitiveness approach to 
economic integration, focussing primarily on the ability to sell of individual firms. A closer 
look at the facts reveals that this is too narrow a perspective to derive any firm conclusions 
about the implications European economic integration might have with regard to 
development prospects of backward coootries - however disappointing that may be for 
politicians all too easily blaming economic integration for their own failures. 
II. OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
The paper is in five parts. In the first section (paragraph ill) some data on the current 
dispersion of per-capita income within the European Union is presented. As the discussion 
about the consequences of economic integration often refers to the United States, 
corresponding figures for the United States ar!! provided. 
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The following paragraph (IV) gives an overview of the various forms in which the 
divergence hypothesis is stated. Starting with a brief outline of different sources to which the 
divergence is traced back, one of the arguments most prominent in European policy debates, 
namely economies of scale internal to the firm and distance to the market, is chosen for 
further discussion. After looking at the factors which lead to economies of ..,ale, or, in 
general, to the subadditivity of cost functions, the implications for the development of whole 
regions are examined. 
In the third part of the paper (paragraph V) theoretical shortcomings of this divergence 
hypothesis are revealed. As the analysis shows, arguments drawing upon price and cost 
competitiveness due to economies of scale can be misleading as they are most often based 
on microeconomic considerations which need not apply on an aggregate level. Instead, a 
supply-side analysis based on Say's law is developed. 
In the fourth section (paragraph VI) empirical evidence on the validity of the supply-side 
approach to economic integration as compared to the competitiveness-approach is given. 
Rather than adding more econometric evidence to the already existing studies on real 
convergence and divergence undertaken so far,' the approach adopted in this paper is an 
individualistic one which draws upon the experience of Spain joining the European Union. A 
closer look at country-specific indicators of economic performance after entering the 
European Union is in order since it reveals striking differences among countries which can 
hardly be explained by referring to the size of the local market alone. Although some of the 
figures for Spain seem to support the divergence hypothesis, it is shown that the traditional 
interpretation of these indicators along the competitiveness approach is not compatible with 
the rest of the data. A different interpretation is offered which not only fits the data, but is 
also consistent with the supply-side perspective as presented in the paper. 
In a concluding chapter (VII) main results are summarized and some general remarks on 
the discussion about real convergence are made. 
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III. REAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
I. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE 
The concern that already existing differences might even be exacerbated is especially strong 
in the case of the European Union (EU).' If those who predict a growing gap as integration 
is pushed forward prove to be right, regional economic evolutions might indeed become a 
serious problem for Europe, since the cross-country differences in average peracapita income 
are already substantially higher than those between the US states' Figure I highlights the 
case in point. It shows the distribution of the country-specific (state-specific) average per­
capita income in tenDs of the overall EU average (US average). In each case, the overall 
weighted average is indicated by the grey shaded vertical line in the middle. The one to the 
left marks the weighted average in countries (states) that are relatively backward, whereas 
the one to the right shows the respective average for those ahead. Data for the EU member 
states was derived from national data by using purchasing power parity (PPP) as well as 
actual exchange rates as neither provides for an exact aggregation. Calculations drawing 
upon PPP might be more appropriate for long-run phenomena like economic growth. Yet, as 
politics is often guided by the short run, both cases are depicted in figure I. 
Ahhough results differ somewhat depending upon whether the EU data is based on PPP 
or actual exchange rates, the spread of average peracapita income is in any event higher in 
the case of the EU than the US. Referring to the weighted mean of per-capita income in the 
EU and the US in 1990 (the latest data currently available in the case of the US), the spread 
differs Dot so much with regard to states ranked among the highest in terms of average per­
capita income, but with the lowest. On average, per-capita income below the overall mean 
reached only 74.2 (actual exchange rates) or 66.7 (PPP) per cent in the EU, whereas in the 
US it came up to approxitnately 90.2 per cent. Loomg upon the state or country marmg 
the lower boundary, relative differences turn out to be even greater. For in the case of 
Mississippi average per-capita income amounts to at least 70.3 per cent of the overall US 
average. !nthe EU, Portugal brings up the rear, showing an average per-capita income of 
only 33 per cent of the EU average. Penultimate-ranked Greece is not much better oil; with 
35 per cent. !n PPP, the order is reversed, with Greece approaching 47 per cent and 
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Portugal 53 per cent. Yet, although somewhat bigher, the average per-capita income is still 
substantially lower wheo compared to the EU average than in the case of the us. 
Dispersion as usually measured by the coefficieot of variation is also greater within the 
EU than within the US, namely 24.9 compared to 16.5. However, if in the case of the EU 
the national data is converted to US Dollars at PPP, the differeoce in dispersion becomes 
much smaller, for in this case the coefficient of variation for the EU shrinks to 17.8. Clearly, 
individual European countries are known to be more homogenous. On a local or even 
individual basis, dispersion of per capita income is therefore likely to be lower in the EU 
than in the US. From a political economy point of view cross-country differences might 
nevertheless be important for the route further European integration takes. Admittedly, both 
of the calculations, for the EU as well as the US, draw only upon a certain point in time. 
Heoce, it is not clear whether the dispersion in the EU in the future will reflect more closely 
the ODe currently obselVed in the US or whether national income gaps will become even 
bigger in size. However, there is a widespread concern that the latter rather than the former 
is to be expected. 
Questions of regional adjustmeot are expected to become eveo more pressing as the 
economies of Eastern Europe apply for membership in the ED. Since, for instance, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for the time being aU have to be considered 
as periphery in terms of perecapita income, the gap between richer and poorer countries 
within the EU might eveo grow larger, should they join the EU. The same applies with 
regard to the Baltic States. If; in effect, distance to the market and comparative 
diseconomies of scale make catching up for newcomers difficuh, the hope that EU 
membership might leod not only macroeconomic stability to Eastern Europe in the period of 
transition but also provide a developmeot-pull effect would prove to be ill-founded. 
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Figure I : 
RegioTlLlI Dispersion of Per-Capila Income in 1990 
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2. A FUTURE FOR EUROPE WITHOUT FISCAL FEDERALISM? 
Because of the dispersion currently observed, it is frequently stated that convergence and 
cohesion cannot be taken for granted but must be backed by economic policy. And policy 
measures aimed at raising the development potential of the so-called periphery have indeed 
been seen as an integral part of the process of European economic integration from the 
outset. Existing industrial cores, it is often claimed, have to be preserved in order to prevent 
a lasting de-industrialization of entire regions. Following political reasoning, local industries 
as well as whole regions have, if not to be handicapped, to be supported by preferential 
treatment such as tax rate reductions, investment credits, depreciation allowances and direct 
governmental grants. By implementing a special "cohesion fund". government assistance for 
less developed regions has even been extended recently. Yet, some argue that this still falls 
far short of what would be appropriate for equilibrating regional economic development. 
Those who call for a stronger regional focus of European economic policy often refer 
precisely to the United States. In the US, it is maintained, built-in stabilizers are operating on 
a much larger scale than those established within the EU' An often neglected fact would be 
that, although explicit intergovernmental grants play only a minor role in the US, there is an 
implicit vertical compensation mechanism at work which tends to cushion regional 
disparities in economic development. This would iron out at least some of the differences in 
regional economic strength, whereas in the EU there would be no comparable mechanism in 
place. Nevertheless, notable regional evolutions have taken place in recent times in the US' 
IV. INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
NEW AND OLD SCEPTICS 
I. THE CANONICAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE LAW OF 
CONVERGENCE 
According to the traditional approach to international trade as developed by 
Heckscher/Ohlin and reformulated by Samuelson, the concern about the locational 
consequences of economic integration due to strong centrifugal forces lacks a theoretical 
basis.7 Rather than centrifugaL the traditional approach gives support to the dominance of 
centripetal forces. Following the lines of this theory, differences in endowment give rise to 
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specialization. By concentrating on the production of goods and processes in which the 
relatively abundant uctor is used more inteosively, the price of the relatively abundant uctor 
in each country is being pushed upwards, thus leading to a regional equilibration of uctor 
returns via international trade, i.e. convergence. In this framework, intra.industIy trade 
might add flavor to the picture, however, without really reversing resuhs. Thus, the 
intemational division of labor and the pattem of intemational trade are primarily guided by 
comparative advantage due to differeot factor eodowmeots of the ceoter and the periphery. 
Moreover, especially "small" countries should gain from integration. however backward 
they might be. 11>e reason is that the probability of the price structure under autarky being 
close to the one prevailing after economic integration with a region which is bigger in size 
should be relatively small due to their small weight in economic terms. The treod towards 
convergeoce applies also in a world with international capital mobility. Rather than anything 
else, capital on the move will reinforce the teodeocy for convergeoce already prevailing 
through international trade. For, if the periphery is characterized by a relatively small capital 
stock, there is ample room for the expectation that returns on investment are higher and 
wages are lower at the periphery than at the ceoter, thereby inducing capitalllows from the 
ceoter to the periphery. 
Because of diminishing returns, the equilibrating forces are also at work in a groYAh 
setting. Eveo though across-the-board calculations based on the traditional model seem to 
indicate that the dynamics towards convergeoce are not that strong, they provide no backing 
for the notion that the opposite is the case. Wheo the observed capital-output ratio is used as 
a beochmark for the elasticity of output with regard to capital input, an additional capital 
input of some percentage points of GNP yields only a much smaller increase in growth rates. 
This is because the elasticity, as measured by the capital-output ratio, is substantially smaller 
than unity. Most of the persistent differeoces observed are therefore stored in the black box 
of technologieal progress and differeoces in eodowmeot of human capital, without giving a 
satisfitctory answer to the gaps remaining. In any eveot, the gains from integration might be 
smaller than hoped for, but, according to traditional neoclassical analysis, due to diminishing 
retums there are at least some forces prevailing which pull towards a more regionally 
balanced process of economic growth as barriers to trade and mobility are reduced. Growing 
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each year by one or two percentage points more than otherwise is not a factor which can be 
completely ignored. It makes a difference. 
2. A MODEL GOING OUT OF BUSINESS? 
The view of economic integration having a strong centripetal impact has been recently 
challenged by a whole new branch of economic theory, called the new trade and new growth 
theory. The main focus of the new view is the assumption of diseconomies of scale which 
forms a building block of the traditional approach. For if this condition no longer holds, it is 
argiJed, there will be no countervailing forces in place which tend to equilibrate the regional 
pattern of economic activity. The resoh of this would be that in some places economic 
integration leads to a process of self-sustaining economic development whereas in others the 
removal of barriers to trade brings about a shrinking industrial base.8 
In principle, again, two strands of economic theory can be differentiated, the models of 
both of which can give rise to a regional concentration of economic activity. The first 
handles the intratemooral consequences of economies of scale and distance to the market 
and is therefore primarily concerned about the regional allocation of a given aruount of 
economic activity. The subadditivity of the cost function can either be due to indiviSlbilities 
(such as in the case of specialization, networks etc.) or to the so-called two-thirds rule which 
holds for a range of production processes in which the elasticity of the costs with regard to 
output is two-thirds (such as, for instance, in the case of pipelines). A third driving force can 
be the law of large numbers in the case of demand being stochastic as far as bundling allows 
for economizing on costs. Trade is not traced back primarily to exogenous differences in 
endowment, but determined by market structure changing endogenously as driven by 
economies of scale and distance to the market.9 
The second is intertemporal in nature since it examines the regional evolutions of 
economic integration in a growth context. In contrast to the former, the main focus of the 
latter is therefore accumulation. In this setting divergence is due to non-diminishing returns 
of the accumulated fuctors and locational fixity. Most often, non-diminishing returns are 
traced back to economies external to the firm, usually linked to the production of 
knowledge.10 By increasing the stock of knowledge acceSSIble in the economy they thwart 
the law of diminishing returns decisive for a Solowian outcome. Yet, for promoting a 
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clustering of economic activity the non-rivalry nmst become effecrive only on a local basis 
which means that the costs of excluding non-payers nmst decrease significantly with 
distance. Specialization can provide a link between both strands, the static and the dyoamic, 
insofar as it speeds up the process of accumulation. 11 
Table 1: TIre New View of Economic Integration 
[Regional cOm:eotratloo of economic activity due to ... 
"economies of scale". "economies of growth". 
or in general: subadditivity of the cost non-diminishing returns of the accumulated factor; 
function production functions either convex 
either external or internal to the firm or non-convex (non-convexity based on external 
economies, monopolistic competition or financial 
market imperfections) 
Usually traced back to ... 
- indivisibilities - non-rivalry and 
- 213-rule - high costs ofexcIuding users 
- law of large numbers 
and . . . 
proximity to the market locational fixity 
Main contributors: 
- Smith (1176), Marshall (1920), - Marshall (1920) 
Yo_(1928) - Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Mandelbaum (1945), 
- LOsch (1943), Giersch (1949) Nurkse (1953), Myrdal (1957), Hirschman (1958) 
- Stigler (1951) - Romer (1986), Rivera-BatizIRomer (1991), 
- Kaldor (1972) AghionIHowitt (1990), 
- Arthur (1990), Greenwald/Kohn/Stiglitz (1990), Lucas (1988), 
DavidIR06enbloom (1990), GrossmanlHelpnum (1991) 
Knuunan (1991) 
Thus, the new approach to regional evolutions, although arguing at least in some cases 
along different lines, seems to give support again to conclusions already derived from some 
of the development theories of the 1950s and 1960s.12 By stating that, due to forward and 
backward linkages between different kinds of industries, the process of take-off will be 
rendered difficult, they already seemed to draw upon some kind of increasing returns and 
network externalities, now again being seen as a center�piece of differences in regional 
development. However, by assuming either economies of scale or non-diminishing returns. 
both strands of the new view argue basically along the same line, despite differences in 
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focus. By doing so, they arrive by and large at the same conclusions, namely that economic 
integration fosters the agglomeration of economic activity. 
Consequently, we need not even refer necessarily to a dynamic setting which draws upon 
growth theory for deriving agglomeration. According to the arguments put forward, we 
should obSOlVe agglomeration even in a static setting, which allows for reallocation of 
economic activity only. Hereafter, we will therefore focus primarily on the static issue of 
reallocation. 
3. REGIONAL EVOLUTIONS BASED ON PRICE AND COST COMPETITIVENESS? 
The notion that the allocation of economic activity might be rather lopsided in a laissez-faire 
setting is also widespread in economic policy debates. The recent models developed by the 
new trade and new growth theory have fuelled the discussion anew. Main resuhs are gladly 
picked up in economic policy debates without paying further attention to the assumptions 
they are based upon. Instead, the outcome is often taken for granted and interpreted as 
providing a legitimate basis for actively promoting regional development. i3 Frequently, the 
head start of prosperous countries compared to those which are less developed is even 
attributed to economies of scale internal to the firm which could be exploited at the center, 
but not at the periphery. Looking at the shape of the demand curve as usually assumed, it 
seems obvious that firms which are closer to the market are better off in terms of cost and 
price competitiveness since they do not have to incur the additional costs of transportation 
faced by suppliers located at the periphery. Consequently, the penetration of markets seems 
indeed to be much easier for producers that already have a footing in prosperous regions, as 
the size of local markets obviously makes for a head start on the cost curve. In the case of 
integration it seems therefore as if firms located at the center slide do'Ml their cost curve as 
they gain in market share. All those at the periphery instead suffer a loss in market share, 
thereby being forced to operate on a smaller scale at higher costs and finally being pushed 
out of the market. In short: The former gain in international price and cost competitiveness 
»hereas the latter fail even to keep the status quo ante. Time and again, differences in 
regional development are therefore traced back to differences in price and cost 
competitiveness. 
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Seen in this way, the prospects of catching up for relatively backward countries appear 
indeed to be rather disappointing. Instead of taking off; they might be caught in a trap, 
locked in simply because of small regional markets aod comparative diseconomies of scale. 
From there it seems to take only a small step to suppose - wen in advaoce of aoy further 
aoalysis - that the critical mass for initiating a process of self-sustaining economic 
development will not be reached without governmental support. Yet, one might wonder why 
we still observe so diversified a regional structure nowadays or as STIGLER (1951, p. 185) 
put it with regard to ADAM SMITH's famous theorem that the division of labor is limited by 
the extent of the market: "If this proposition is generally applicable, should there not be 
monopolies in most industries?" 
Although already posing theoretical problems conceming the calculation of equilibria, we 
will see that there is indeed more reason than mathematics for being sceptical about the 
validity of the agglomeration hypothesis. For the notion that the new allocation induced by 
economic integration is somewhat lopsided rests on three crucial assumptions, all of which 
imply that the periphery will become even more backward. 
V. A SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
THREE REASONS FOR BEING MORE OPTIMISTIC 
I .  A METHODOLOGICAL ISSUE: LACK OF EXPLANATORY POWER 
The first premise implicit in the argument is that the landscape is already scattered with 
centers at the beginning, ie. it does not explain how they develop in the first place. The way 
the individual actions are coordinated in the beginning remains largly a black box. But, like 
the case of dtiving on the left or the right of the street,14 which might be considered as 
equivalent ex ante, the question arises why the former is chosen rather than the latter since 
there seems to be no case of Pareto-superiority prevailing. True, if by accident one set is 
bigger in size (either those dtiving on the left or those dtiving on the right) thao the other, it 
forms a basin of attraction. From thereon, there is a strong incentive for switching to the set 
already bigger in number which even increases as differences in size become greater. Yet, 
merely invoking accident is quite unsatisfactory a solution. For the question of why there is 
more thao one center still remains to be aoswered. The latter obviously requites a closer 
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, 
look at the forces which make for regional concentration. Thus, it seems as though we are 
back to our initial question without having gained many more insights. 
If it is assumed that the landscape is inhomogenous, providing some places with a natural 
Ioeational advantage. the presumption of an uneven regional distnoution of economic 
activity seems not that far-fetched and therefore might well be accepted. Furthermore, from 
the perspective of European economic integration, the question of how centers start up from 
scratch might be considered irrelevant, since this is already a bygone from the point of 
departure. Although the question of how new centers evolve still lies very much at the heart 
of the dynamics of economic integration, it shall therefore be supposed for a moment that an 
uneven distribution of economic activity is already given, without investigating further how 
the evolutionary dynamics got started. Yet, a considerable portion of discomfort remains. 
Furthermore, even if we put the lack of explanatory power aside, it is by no means clear 
whether agglomeration is the outcome of the dynamics initiated by economic integration. 
This is for two reasons, namely a micro economic and a macroeconomic one. 
2. THE MISSING VARIABLE: 
THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSPORTATION COSTS 
The microeconomic rationale to be more optimistic lies in the dynamics of the costs of 
transportation. The belief that a strong core-periphery pattern emerges from economic 
integration assumes that the costs of transportation increase in a linear fashion with distance 
to the market and volume of goods supplied. Yet, if transportation itself shows economies of 
scale the regional evolutions might be quite different from those assumed by the new view. 
For in this case, the regional evolutions depend upon whicb of both effects is stronger, the 
one prevailing at the level of production or the one at the level of transportation. 
The case in point is not primarily the fact that transportation itself is characterized by 
economies of scale. What matters is the dynamics, namely whether the decrease in 
transportation costs in time is stronger than the cbange in costs of production in time. l' If 
transportation shows a stronger dynamic towards the exploitation of economies of scale, the 
regional division of labor should increase rather than decrease as integration proceeds. 
Although the impact of a decline in transportation costs itself is ambiguous, the dynamics in 
relative costs might well shift comparative advantage of some industries towards the 
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periphery. For it is primarily the latter which can take advantage from economies of scale in 
transportation. Looking at the history of transportation technology such as for instance 
ships, aircraft and telecommunication, even in a microeconomic setting, we can no longer be 
sure that economies of scale inevitably promote a regional concentration of economic 
activity. Not only is transportation by itself characterized by economies of scale, as all of 
these technologies allow for bundling, but overall costs of transportation have also 
decreased significantly over time. Hence, focussing on production is not only too narrow a 
perspective, but might even give rise to wrong conclusions. 
3. MORE BARRIERS TO LOPSIDED ALLOCA nON: 
SAY'S LAW AND THE MOBILITY ISSUE 
This applies all the more once the economic repercussions of the competition on product 
markets are added to the picture. A general equih"brium perspective reveals that neither the 
cost-push effect of competition at the center is sufficiently recognized nor is Say's law which 
creates balance of payments constraints on the lopsided allocation of economic activity. Yet 
both deserve a closer look, the first of which shall be at the cost-push effect. Once it is 
recalled that there is not only a rivalry for purchasing power, but also a rivalry for inputs, it 
becomes apparent that the notion of economic activity becoming more regionally 
concentrated frequently stems from a microeconomic perspecrive focussing on the ability to 
sell.16 This is at least the case as far as European: economic integration is concerned. By 
looking primarily at product markets, the hypothesis that EU integration keeps the periphery 
from catching up disregards the fact that the competitive position of each firm not only 
depends upon the position of its foreign competitors, but very much upon how other 
domestic firms performl7 (which in principle can also benefir from being close to the 
market). There is no doubt that, with regard to product markets, competition becomes 
indeed Intra-European. 18 Thus, looking at product markets, one gets the impression that the 
change in market share as well as earnings hinges on the question of how each domestic firm 
performs vis-a·vis its foreign competitors in the relevant market. Therefore, an increase in 
the ability to sell of an individual firm in the course of economic integration seems indeed to 
translate automatically into a higher ability to sell of the economy in general, thus promoring 
agglomeration of economic activity; 
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Yet this kind of "competitiveness-approach", with its focos on the fac<>-to-face 
competition between snppliers of different origin who struggle for the same market, i.e. the 
same purchasing power, can be quite misleading. Before deriving any firm conclusions about 
the regional evolutions economic integration might induce, it has to be recognized that each 
firm also has to be competitive in local factor markets. Whereas with regard to product 
markets competition becomes increasingly global, things can be quite different when it 
comes to competition in factor markets. As intemational capital mobility is quite high, 
competition for capital is to a large degree international as well But this is definitely not the 
case with regard to labor. 19 
Although data on international migration is rather poor. it gives every indication that until 
now it has remained relatively low. One of the main sources providing data on international 
migration on a regularly basis is the OECD. Table 2 gives an overview. It sbows the stock of 
foreign labor as compiled by the OECD as a per cent of the national labor force. Labor force 
instead of employment was chosen for comparison since in most cases the stock of foreign 
labor as publisbed also contains the unemployed. Admittedly, there is good reason to assume 
that the numbers depicted underestimate the amount of migration. First, all statistics on 
mobility are incomplete. This applies especially the less regulated international mobility 
becomes. Thus, the statistics on Intra-European mobility tend to become less informative the 
more the EU effectively moves towards a single market. Second, all those applying 
successfully for citizenship are no longer registered in the stock of foreign labor. 
Consequently, data on international labor mobility has to be interpreted very carefully with 
regard to conclusions about the development of international mobility over time. Referring 
to the last point, change of citizenship, flow statistics would do better since they would 
allow something like the effective openness of national labor markets (e.g. inflows + 
outflows as per cent of labor market turnover or net inflows) to be measured. Unfortunately, 
there are no overall EU statistics available on the subject, which include Intra-EU migration. 
The only overall numbers of the OECD refer to inflows and outflows offoreign population, 
which are by definition bigger in size. To multiply by average participation rates would not 
do the job since there is good reason to assume that participation rates of the overall 
population and foreigners flowing in and out differ substantially without having any firm 
basis of whether the bias is in one or the other direction. 
-
20 -
'"
 
�
 
I 
...
.. v .
... 
�.
 "
,n"
, "
 ..
...
.... fI
 ...
...
. 6
' ..
... 
"'f
I v
 &JW
vv
, •
.......
....
....
...
... LJ
'-'
 '-'
''' .
...
..
...
.... 
St
oc
ks
 o
f f
or
ei
gn
 la
bo
r 
in
 p
er
 (
en
t o
f n
at
io
na
l l
ab
or
 fo
rc
e 
Y
ea
r 
C
ou
nt
rv
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
86
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
B
el
2i
um
 
4.
58
 
4.
32
 
4.
60
 
4.
41
 
4.
36
 
4.
35
 
4.
29
 
4.
34
 
4.
73
 
n .
a 
F
ra
nc
e 
6.
07
 
6.
33
 
6.
64
 
6.
95
 
6.
84
 
6.
42
 
6.
26
 
6.
36
 
6.
47
 
6.
26
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
5.
87
 
5,
63
 
5.
50
 
5.
13
 
5.0
0 
4.
98
 
5.
03
 
5.
11
 
5.
16
 
5.
27
 
L
uu
m
-
34
.1
2 
34
.1
8 
35
.1
6 
34
.4
2 
35
.4
8 
37
.6
3 
40
.0
6 
43
.1
1 
46
.7
5 
51
.3
3 
bo
u ..
. 
N
et
he
r-
3.
14
 
2.
95
 
2.
77
 
2.
68
 
2.
63
 
2.
64
 
2.
11
 
2.
65
 
2.
86
 
2.
87
 
la
nd
s 
SD
ai
n 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 
n.
a . 
n.
a.
 
0.
40
 
0.
47
 
0.
51
 
UK
 
n.
a. 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 
2.
79
 
2.
91
 
2.
93
 
2.
90
 
3.
06
 
3.
18
 
3.
07
 
T
ot
al
 
5.
68
 
5.
62
 
5,
65
 
�
.7
6 
4.7
3 
4.8
1 
4.
6\
 
-'
.2
 
4.2
7 
�
.2
J 
So
ur
ce
: O
EC
D 
(1
99
3)
. O
EC
D 
(l
99
-1b
). 
ow
n
 c
o/
clI
/a
Ua
m
 
Se
as
on
al
 w
or
ke
rs
 a
nd
 fr
on
tie
r w
Qr
ke
r.\
' a
re
 e
xc
lu
de
d.
 e
xc
ep
t f
or
 G
er
m
an
y, 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
 a
nd
 Ih
e 
V
et
he
rl
O/
ub
 ...
•
 =
 
fn
te
rte
m
po
ra
l c
om
pa
ra
bi
lity
 is
 li
m
ite
d 
du
e 
to
 
dif
fer
en
ce
s i
n 
ag
gr
eg
at
io
ll 
19
91
 
n.
a.
 
6.
03
 
5.
57
 
n.
a.
 
3.
05
 
0.
69
 
2.
90
 
114
.2
1 
Moreover, inflows and outllows as published by the OECD differ in definition so that no 
meaningful net flows can be derived therefrom Anyway, having all these caveats in mind, 
we can still say that effective labor mobility was not only fiUrly stable throughout the eighties 
but was also still relatively low. This makes for rather strong limits on the regional 
evolutions of economic activity. 
The reason is straightforward: For economies of scale and distance to the market to drive 
whole countries out of business, it is necessary that the competitiveness of a country is the 
sum of the ability to sell of its local firms. Yet this is definitely not the case as long as there 
are several sectors in a country which compete for the same scarce but quite immobile 
resource, namely labor (for instance the national automobile industty and other branches). In 
this case, gaining in market share (e.g. by the German automobile industry) must come at the 
expense of other local suppliers (e.g. German chemical industty). For expanding production 
is only possible by bidding resources away from other uses which means bidding up the price 
of the resource. Whereas the competitive position of foreign suppliers (e.g. the "Spanish" 
automobile industry as well as other Spanish industries) will almost be left untouched by the 
local increase in costs, other local suppliers will filce a tough stance. Thus, at the same time 
as some local suppliers gain in market share (or to be more precise, are more successful) due 
to economies of scale and being close to the market, the relative competitive position in 
other seetors of the economy will change in filvor of foreign suppliers, driving other local 
suppliers out of business. 
The crowding-out effect need not take place if the situation prevailing is a purely 
Keynesian one with cyclical unemployment in which either money supply or velocity are 
determined by desired spending. But this sitnation is not the one currently at hand.20 
Ahhough there can be no doubt that there is a cyclical component in European 
unemployment, the main part of unemployment has proven to be persistent during cyclical 
swings, showing that structural unemployment carries much more weight nowadays. And 
that money supply is in filet endogenous is lacking a firm basis so filr. Hence as 
nowadays, the cyclical component is rather minor and money supply is fiUrly stable, things 
turn out to be quite different: It is the ability to sell of some firms and the competition for 
immobile resources in the center which often impedes the ability to sell of others located in 
the same region. The price of immobile resources is pushed up and so are the costs of 
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producing in the same area. The cost-push effect of competition at the center makes it easier 
for producers located at the periphery to acquire markets much pay. Hence, innnobile 
resources, while being scarce at the same time, make economies of scale on an aggregate 
level un1ikely. 
Figure 2: The Different Levels of Competition: An Example 
German Competition Spanish 
Labor Market for Labor Market 
Immobile Ressources 
• • • • 
• • • • 
Other Product "Spa- Other 
German Auto- Market nishll Spanish 
Indu- mobile- Auto- Indu-
stries Indu- � � Competition "'- mobile- stries stry for I" Indu-
Purchnsing stry 
Power 
� � � 
International Capital Market 
Competition for Mobile Resources 
The development-push effect also works through the balance of payments. For it is 
precisely the lack of international labor mobility which serves as a binding factor between the 
expon-side and the itnpon-side of the current aC.count. The reason is Say's law, which states 
that every buyer must be a seUer.'1 Or to put it differently: DCD2aDd presupposes a 
marketable supply which provides the means to purchase products supplied by the center. 
But, Say's Law and the competitiveness approach are hard to reconcile. 
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Even if it is assumed that the center has a better start, i.e. a higher ability to sell 
throughout ex ante, it is by no means certain whether this shows up in a surge in exports, ie. 
ex post. Due to balance of payments constraints faced by the periphery, the center will 
hardly sell more without buying more unless the periphery becomes more attractive to 
investors. The latter, however, would run contrary to the arguments posted by the sceptics 
since capital would not be attracted if investors did not expect that the periphery's ability to 
sell would climh thereafter. Consequently, neither can the center increase its net exports that 
easily, nor does a boost in exports necessarily have an expansionary impact. 
Admittedly, it is not only volume which is important, but prices too. However, the terms 
of trade of the periphery need not deteriorate as long as the production structure of both, the 
center and the periphery, is not biased towards the same industries.22 But there is no reason 
to suppose that the latter is definitely the case as there is a variety of products. For each of 
the products economies of scale and the extent of the market may well differ as both depend 
upon the production technique employed and the stage of the product cycle that has been 
reached. Moreover, economies of scale by themselves do not yet form a bamer to entry 
which gives rise to market power, thus allowing for a change in prices in favor of the center. 
What ultimately has to be taken into account is that there is not only one center, but several 
centers which all compete for a third market, namely the periphery. The removal of barriers 
to trade and mobility will be depressing for the periphery, if the center does have (on 
average) the better starting position and if; in addition, at the very start both structures are 
biased towards the same products and production techniques. Clearly, as far as rigidities and 
the costs implied thereby are concerned, it is national economic policy which is to blame 
more than economic integration. But the very fact that in this case the ability to seD oflocal 
producers is preserved via a real depreciation provides a clear-cut indicator for the validiry 
of the divergence hypothesis based on path dependence which itself is due to economies of 
scale and distance to the market. However, as we will see shortly, looking at the 
performance of newcomers in the EU, the data will not be equally clear-cut in support of the 
divergence hypothesis. Obviously, other factors matter much more when it comes to 
catching up or falling behind than simply economies of scale and local market size. 
In any event, there is already a body of evidence concerning EU enlargement as weD as 
EU deepening on the one hand and regional evolutions on the other hand which allows for 
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the assessment of the individual performance of newcomers. Hereafter we will therefore 
concentrate on the economic performance of Spain right after joining the EU in the mid­
eighties and on Spanish price and cost competitiveness in particular. As Spain was 
handicapped as fiIr as relative local market size is concerned, one should observe that price 
and cost competitiveness deteriorated as markets were opened, provided the pessimistic 
\'lew holds: While producers at the center slide down their cost curve as economies of scale 
and local market size provide for a head stan, Spanish producers have to spread their fixed 
costs over an ever smaller quantity sold as producers located at the center conquer Spanish 
markets. Yet, it will turn out that although price and cost competitiveness worsened right 
after entering the EU and foreign trade slipped into deficit, both movements, in relative 
prices as well as in trade flows, cannot be traced back to economies of scale and local 
markets being smaller, but are basically in line with the canonical model and the supply-side 
approach to economic integration. 
VI. SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON REGIONAL EVOLUTIONS 
I. SPAIN: FROM PERIPHERY TO MEMBERSHIP 
Hence, focussing on the convergence issue, there are two competing views which have to be 
checked as to whether they are consistent with the data, namely the competitiveness 
hypothesis and the supply-side hypothesis. While both predict a decline in price and cost 
competitiveness in the course of integration, the interpretation differs substantiaI1y. In the 
case of the former it is interpreted as a sign of falling behind, whereas in the case of the latter 
it is pan of the adjustment process while catching up. Yet, as fiIr as Spain is concerned, the 
macro-data at the early stage of entry are clearly in line with the supply-side view: a 
significant fraction of the decline in price and cost competitiveness took place while 
investment was on the rise which was panly financed by long term capital impons. 
Later on, the process of catching up got stuck and during the worldwide recession of the 
early nineties Spain even lost ground vis-a-vis the rest of the EU in terms of per-capita 
income. Investment declined, the maturity of capital inflows dropped and finally the 
exchange rate collapsed. But although the worldwide recession contributed thereto, the 
reason for performing poorly was basically home-made. It was especially fiscal policy which 
proved to be quite costly as it not only failed to curb deficit spending, but in the early 
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nineties even posted substantially higher deficits. However, the evolution of price and cost 
competitiveness as weD as tra�e flows will be addressed first. 
As filr as trade is concerned, joining the EU implied quite a change for Spain since due to 
a rather high rate of effective protection Spain was much less open than the rest of the EU 
member states, and even much less so than Portugal and Greece. Whereas effective 
openness as measured by imports plus exports of goods and services relative to GDP 
reached on average 61 per cent in the EU of twelve, Spain was well below, showing only a 
ratio of 44.3 per cent. Portugal was filr ahead with 78 per cent and Greece had at least a 
ratio of 54 per cent.23 Although using the total of exports and imports as per cent of GOP as 
a proxy for openness is not without its problems, the evolutions observable should have thus 
been rather strong in case of Spain. 
Indeed, the step towards Iiberalizjng economic relations between Spain and the rest of the 
EU had substantial consequences for the vohune as well as the structure of trade flows. 
Whereas imports increased substantially thereafler, exports remained almost stagnant. 
Subsequently, namely in 1988, the balance on current account slipped into deficit, showing a 
negative sign until the end of 1992. Although significantly smaner in size, the current 
account remained also in deficit in 1993.24 Yet, the main swing took place between 1985 
(+1.7 per cent of GOP) and 1989 (-3.0 per cent of GOP). Since deficits climbed just as 
Spain entered the EU, it appears that becoming a member of the EU had in this case not only 
a trade-diverting effect, with Spanish/Non-EU trade slowing down and SpanishlEU trade on 
the rise, but also a direct impact on the current account. Seeing that current-account deficits 
concentrated in trade with the EU members, most of which were more developed than 
Spain, at least part of the deficits were traced back to the center's superiority in terms of cost 
and price competitiveness. " 
Usually, different concepts of real exchange rates serve as an indicator for the 
development of domestic costs and prices relative to those of foreign competitors. They are 
all detived by deflating the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate with different price and 
cost indices, the most common of which are import and export unit values, GNP deflators, 
CPls and unit labor costs (either with reference ·to manufilcturing or to the economy in 
general). Taking PPP as a reference, deviations are often interpreted as shifts in international 
-
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competitiveness, with an appreciation signalling a deterioration of the price and cost 
competitiveness of the economy under consideration. 
Judged by this standard, Spain performed badly right after entering the EU: Ahhough 
different in degree, most of the indicators sbow an increase and therefore a worsening of the 
competitive position of Spanish suppliers compared to their foreign competitors (figure 3). 
When measured in the same currency, Spanish goods became much more expensive than 
those supplied by the rest of the European Union. Real exchange rates based on export unit 
values increased by 10 pp between 1985 and 1990, those calculated by CPIs rose by 32 pp, 
and drawing upon GNP deflators they climbed by some 22 pp. 
Figure 3: 
Indicators of Price and Cost Competitiveness: Spain 1985-1994 
1985=100 
.., 
ex> 
'" 
Source: Banco de Espaita 
CP}: Consumer Prices; ULC: Unit lAbor Costs; EP: Export Prices. 
-- CPI 
-- ULC 
o EP 
In addition, many observers wbo are concerned about the international performance of an 
economy concentrate on some kind of cost index. Their main argnment is that competitive 
positions might be kept for some time by accepting a shrinkage of margins, in which case the 
relative development in prices might not be informative about the true competitive 
position.'" A shift in costs on the other hand could be interpreted as a clear sign of a change 
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in competitiveness. Yet the cost component on which most of the discussion is focussed is 
the cost of a factor which is relative immobile, namely labor. This seems plausible, since 
many firms obviously cannot keep up with their international competitors when the latter do 
not have to cope with a similar increase in costs. However, with an increase of 31 pp the 
picture is basically the same if exchange rates are deflated by unit labor costS.27 Thus, in 
terms of price and cost competitiveness the Spanish economy fell behind immediately after 
Spanish markets were opened to foreign competitors." 
The change in trade flows as well as international price and cost competitiveness 
corresponds to what the competitiveness approach to economic integration would predict. 
Performing poorly in terms of price and cost competitiveness seems to be in line with 
argnments put forward in favor of the divergence hypothesis. For the center showing an 
improvement in terms of price and cost competitiveness as barriers to trade are removed 
seems to fit into the picture of firms located at the center having generally a higher ability to 
sell due to economies of scale and being closer to the market. 
2. LOSING GROUND IN INTERNATIONAL PRICE AND COST 
COMPETITIVENESS: 
CATClllNG UP OR FALLING BEHIND? 
However, the fact that Spain lost ground in terms of price and cost competitiveness just as it 
faced EU competition more strongly cannot be attnDuted to the center's head start on the 
cost cwve. To arrive at this conclusion, one need not refer to cal�tion problems, vJrich 
might be severe indeed.29 For, as already has been pointed out, a decline in the ability to sell 
which is the direct outcome of an unfavorable development in costs and prices would have 
been associated either with a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate or a loss in foreign 
reserves. 
Yet the evolution of the Spanish economy is clearly marked by two different periods: In 
the fitst period, right after entering the EU, the nominal exchange rate climbed and foreign 
exchange had been accumulated. The second period, by contrast, was characterized by the 
collapse of the nominal exchange rate and the decline in foreign reserves (table 3). 
The competitiveness approach clearly fails to explain this up-and-down pattern, whereas 
a supply-side interpretation using an intertempora! tradeableslnon-tradeables model can offer 
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a consistent explanation of the macroeconomic evolution. According to the latter, the 
worsening of the usual indicators for assessing international competitiveness right after 
joining the EU has also to be seen in the context of the surge in capital inflows, while the 
improvement thereafter was partly due to the fuet that structural adjustment was under way 
and partly due to deficit spending which considerably impaired locational quality. 
Table 3: 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate and Change in Foreign Reserves: 
Spain 1985-93 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
nominal 
effective 100 96.84 99.38 104.05 107.65 107.79 105.42 93.21 87.08 
exchange rates 
1985-100) 
change in 
foreign -371.1 +318.7 +1593.2 +961.8 +581.2 +709.8 +l489.1 -1778.0 -566.0 
reserves I(biU Pti) 
Source: Banco de Espana. 
The decline in international price and cost competitiveness which took place in the first 
period was clearly part of a catching-up process: Due to fuvorable expeetations regarding 
future profitability, investment activity boomed. As savings fell short of investment, 
investment was partly financed by capital inflows. However, with net capital imports on the 
rise, the structure of demand usually changes as well. While tradeable prices are basically 
given by the rest of the world, supply elasticity is usually much smaller in the case of non­
tradeables. Consequently, relative prices change as a fraction of the additional funds is 
devoted to non-tradeables, thus leading to a real appreciation of the exchange rate.3O 
Because of the demand for non-tradeables the net effeet of the surge in capital imports on 
the market for foreign exchange will be an increase in demand for the capital-import 
currency.31 Hence, the setback in price and cost competitiveness right after Spain joining the 
EU can well be explained by resorting to an intertemporal tradeableslnon-tradeables model. 
If there is not much room for nominal exchange rate movements, the real appreciation 
necessary for the corresponding adjustment of international trade flows can only be brought 
about by inflationary pressure, complicating the task of monetary policy in pursuing the goal 
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of price stability." And indeed, trying to curb inflation on the one hand and aiming at 
exchang ... rate shadowing" on the other hand turned out to be difficuh in Spain as the surge 
in capital inflows kept the Peseta under pressure. Stabilizing the nominal exchange rate was 
therefore only possible by accumulating international reserves. Furthermore, whereas the 
inflation differential between Spain and other EU member countries fell in absolute terms as 
from the late seventies, the gap widened again from 1987 onwards " However, the very fact 
that foreign reserves were accurnulated right after Spain joining the EU is inconsistent with 
the competitiveness approach to economic integration. Instead, it supports the supply-side 
view. 
The setback in international price and cost competitiveness at the very beginning of 
membership must not be interpreted as signalling a favorable development throughout; the 
real appreciation is not only due to preferences differing as purchasing power is shifted. 
Given differences in demand, it also reflects the structural elasticity of supply. The more 
hampered by rigidities, the stronger the real appreciation necessary for bringing the real 
transfer about will be. Moreover. the more investors expect the real appreciation to fade in 
the future, the higher an interest rate they will ask for. Consequently, net capital itnports will 
be smaller than otherwise. 
After a while the trend in price and cost competitiveness will be reversed � even in cases 
in which economic prosepcts stay favorable and the economy keeps on catching Up.3' This is 
because the demand for foreign exchange rises as supply expands in the non-tradeables 
sector and as demand shifls from non-tradeables to tradeables. Hence, the Marshallian 
dynamics make for an up-and-down pattern of the real exchange rate in the course of 
catching up with the help of capital itnports. However, in the case of Spain investors also 
became increasingly reluctant, thus putting additional pressure on the exchange rate, which 
finally collapsed. 
This supply-side explanation is clearly supported by the intertemporal pattern of 
investment activity and capital inflows. While strong at the beginning of EU-membership, 
investment activity and net capital inflows not only ebbed after a while, but investors even 
turned their back upon Spain as fiscal policy moved increasingly onto the track towards 
unsustainability: In the period 1984-88, the growth rate of investment (figure 4) exceeded 
that of the EU average by approx. 6 pp.36 Investment would hardly have soared ifprospects 
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concerning the ability to sell had been dim Instead, they indicated the expectation by 
investors of a higher rate of return in Spain than that they were able to reap by investing 
their funds in the old center of Europe. That productivity growth remained rather flat does 
not prove the opposite since employment was on the rise.37 
Figure 4: 
Real Fixed Capital Formation: Spain 1984-1993 
Changes in per cent from previous year 15 ,-�- �--- - ����- - - ------- -, 
10  
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-15L-----------------------------------� 
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Source: International Monetary Fund and Banco de Espana 
o 
0> 
0> � 
In the period from 1988-90, the growth rate of investment decelerated before coming to a 
hah in 1991. During the recession of 1992/93 investment even declined in real terms. But the 
fact that Spanish investment activity became quite sluggish cannot be solely traced back to 
the cyclical downswing of the world economy. It was also fiscal policy which proved to be 
detrimental to locational quality. Whereas other countries experiencing an up�g in 
growth rates, such as Mexico and Thailand in the late eighties," have used the opportunity 
to curb deficit spending, Spain failed to do so. Although public deficits slowed down 
somewhat compared to the average of the last three years before the boom, they remained 
high, thereby sucking up capital Insofar as funds have not been used for investment, but for 
government consumption, future growth prospects are diminished rather than increased. 
Clearly, that the financial balance of the private sector coming down from 7.7 per cent of 
GDP in 1986 to -0.1 per cent ofGDP in the late eighties contributed to net capital demand, 
shows that the surge in capital imports was also due to Spain becoming more attractive as a 
location for production. Nonetheless, the latter is no excuse for a policy of benign neglect 
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concerning the budget since net savings of the public sector, aIthougb significantly higber 
than in 1986, still made for -2.8 per cent of GOP." 
The fiIilure to consolidate government finances did indeed prove to be very problematic 
as the world economy slipped into recession at the beginning of the nineties, with Spain 
posting a deficit of7.3 per cent of GNP at the bottom of the recession in 1993 and Spanish 
policy suffering from severe credibility problems. With primary balances in deficit and real 
interest rates significantly exceeding real growth rates, fiscal policy proves not only to be 
unsustainable, but is also detrimental to catching up. Seeing the fiscal authorities playing 
Ponzi40 is no invitation for investors, since it usually means that either higher taxes are to be 
expected or that inflation is lurking around the comer. The Iiillure to curb deficit spending 
led to a crowding-out of investment as competition for capital became much stiffer due to 
the capital shortage in the aftermath of German unilication. With German interest rates on 
the rise Spanish capital markets became quite dry once the Expo' 92 and the Olympic games 
were bygones. The newcomer effect on the demand side surely contnbuted to the hardship 
faced by Spain and the slide of the Peseta in the early nineties. The process of catching up 
not only came to a halt, but even gave way to a severe crisis. But the flattening out of 
growth rates cannot be entirely traced back to a change in circumstances, as Spanish policy 
is all but painting a clear picture of where to go. Obviously, the latter is neither a matter of 
economies of scale nor of local market size. 
The balance of payments mirrors the ups and downs of investment activity and locational 
quality: Between 1986 and 1989 investment rates took off by some 5.6 pp, while the 
Spanish savings rate climbed much less, namely by 1.0 pp." Consequently, a significant part 
of the increase in investment was financed by capitaiimports. Whereas the current. account 
showed a s1igbt surplus until the end of 1987, net capital imports increased substantially in 
1987, aIthougb in 1986 the capital account still showed more outflows than inflows of 
capital. From 1987 on, however, net capital imports rose steadily until they peaked in 1991, 
reaching more than 30 mill. US-S (5.9 per cent of GNP). 
If losing ground in international competitiveness due to the superior standing of the 
center of Europe in most of the markets had been the reason for the swing in trade flows, 
the intertemporal pattern would have been a different one, with the current account taking 
the lead, accompanied by a decline in reserves. 42 However, net capital imports stayed well 
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ahead of current-account deficits, until 1991. Thereafter, net capital inflows petered out, so 
that the capital account was almost balanced in 1993. 
Figure 5: 
The Spanish Balance of Payments in the Eighties 
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Source: Ministerlo de Economio y Hacienda, Secretaria de Estado de Comercio and Banco de Espana, 
International Monetary Fund. 
The evolution of locational quality is also reflected by the structure of capital imports. 
Right after entering the EU most of the capital inflows were long-term in natnre: Whereas 
net long-term capital inflows amounted to 2.5 per cent of GOP in the period 1986-90 (on an 
annual basis), net short term capital inflows remained comparatively small with 0.6 per cent 
of GOP." The share of capital imports accounting for ditect foreign investment was also 
rather high by international standards. By reacbiog on average 1.65 per cent of GOP in the 
period 1986-90, gross foreign ditect investment contnbuted to almost 17 per cent of gross 
fixed capital formation (construction excluded). In the period 1981-85, by contrast, foreign 
ditect investment accounted for only 9 per cent of total investment (0.7 per cent of GOP). In 
the late eighties/early nineties, however, the matnrity structure changed significantly as the 
average matnrity became much shorter, indicatiog that investors increasingly lost confidence 
in the Spanish economy. 
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As a resuh, Spanish growth rates exceeded those of the EU average by 1.5 percentage 
points in the first years after entering the EU." Whereas in 1985, before joining the EU, 
Spain reached only approx. 71 per cent of the per-capita income in the EU (at PPP exchange 
rates), relative per-capita income climbed almost steadily thereafter, going up to 77 per cent 
in the ·early nineties, before slightly faDing back in 1993 due to the world-wide recession 
being aggravated by internal problems. 
Figure 6: 
Per-Capita Income: Spain vis-iI·v;s the European Union· 
EU=100 
�r-----------------------------------------, 
78 
78 
74 
72 
70 
Source: EW"Opean Economy and Euros/at. 
* at Purchasing Power Parity. 
Compared to previous periods, the relative performance of Spain was almost rock­
bottom in the mid-eighties. The notion that the relative growth in per capita income is not 
showing primarily benefirs from integration, but merely a regaining oflost ground, would be 
too short a perspective though. An argrunent like this would only be valid if the relative 
performance were the outcome of a cyclical swiog lagging or leading the EU average. 
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Nonetheless, relative GDP per capita slowed down steadily as from the mid-seventies, quite 
independently from any cyclical fluctuations, before it took off in the mid-eightie�' 
Hence, the first period of EU merobersl>ip was clearly a period of catching up, wbile the 
second was characterized by stagnation and decline. But rather than economies of scale and 
distance to the market, it was Spanish economic policy itself which proved detrimental to 
locational quality, thus impairing economic growth. Right after entering the EU, filvorable 
prospects due to the integration of markets dominated. Capital was attracted despite the filct 
that the fiscal authorities kept on posting high deficits. Clearly, with unemployment rates still 
in two digits and a productivity gap much smaller than the income gap vis-a-vis the EU 
average, even at this stage much remained to be done. In the late eighties/early nineties, 
however, the evaluation by international investors changed significantly. In effect, 
investment was crowded out by public deficits. Hence, that openness not solely entails the 
possibility of coming in from the cold, but can likewise speed up the slide downwards, was 
also exemplified by the experience of Spain. 
VII. HOW FAR CAN WE PUSH THE "LAW OF CONVERGENCE"? 
The concern that the prevailing center-periphery pattern is reinforced as integration 
proceeds rests on some implicit assumptions which prove to be rather fragile. Besides the 
filct that the starting point of the core-periphery pattern is in most cases assumed rather than 
explained, it is the focus on production and product markets that provides the main 
shortcoming of the argnment. If the dynamics in the costs of production are offset by the 
dynamics in transportation costs, the regional division of labor might be increasing rather 
than decreasing in the course of economic integration. Moreover, if it recognized that there 
are different levels of competition, namely product markets and factor markets, one might 
well come to the conclusion that integration provides a development-pull effect rather than a 
setback for the periphery. In effect, if Intra-EU mobility is low, a superior performauce by 
some industries located at the center will imply that others at the center filll behind, which 
allows the periphery to pull forward. The development-pull effect also works through the 
balance of payments since according to Say's law buying and selling are two sides !>f the 
same coin. If in spite of everything the periphery should indeed suffer a setback in its attempt 
to catch up, either the exchange rate would filce severe pressure and/or foreign reserves 
would meh away. But, experience has shown that several of the newcomers underwent 
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anything but a painful depreciation losing foreign ex�ange right after joining the EU, 
although clearly being periphery in terms of relative market size. 
Spain is a case in point. Ahbough clearly marked by two different periods, the evolution 
of the Spanish economy basically supports the supply-side view. The first period right after 
entering the EU was clearly marked by a decline in cost and price competitiveness. 
However, Spain's poor perfonnance in international price and cost competitiveness right 
after joining the EU has to be taken as an indicator of catcbing up rather than IilIIing bebind. 
Instead of being a signal that Spain, i.e. the periphery, was not able to get a firm footing in a 
substantial number of markets due to Spanish firms operating on a smaller scale,46 the loss in 
cost and price competitiveness was an integral part of the process of catcbing up with the 
help of net capital itnports as can be seen by the fact that exchange-rate shadowing led to a 
sigoificant increase in foreign reserves. Obviously, at this early stage of EU membership, 
unexploited profit opportunities originating from the division oflabor dominated any of the 
structural shortcomings besetting the Spanish economy. As time went by, however, 
structural rigidities and the lack of fiscal discipline became increasingly itnportant. Capital 
markets dried up, investment rates dropped and the effective exchange rate plummeted. 
However, rather than economies of scale and distance to the market, it was economic policy 
which itnpaired locational qualitY, thus showing again the validity of supply-side aspects. 
To sum up: The fact that the starting position is a different one for each of the countries 
participating in European economic integration does by no means itnply that the gap in 
economic activity must necessarily increase because of differences in the starting position. 
Second, although plausible at fitst glance, international price and cost competitiveness, as 
usually measured, is a rather poor indicator with regard to income divergence. As in the case 
of Spain, the relative increase in local costs and prices need not be part of becoming even 
more backward, but can be part of the process ofcatcbing up. 
The case of Spain in the second half of the eighties by no means itnplies that every 
departure from PPP showing a loss of international competitiveness can be interpreted as a 
part of pulling forward. Nor does it follow that there is an automatic mechanism which 
enables the periphery to catch up once barriers to trade and mobility are removed. Rather, it 
requires constant efforts on preserving competitiveness in terms oflocational quality. This is 
all the more applicable since there is not ooly the center as an alternative; investors can 
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choose among different parts of the periphery too. As the turbulence of the Peseta in the 
period 1994-95 shows, the confidence of international investors may have weakened too 
SOOD. 
In addition, some general caveats are in order: By focussing on the relative impact of 
economic integration one might nevertheless be tempted to conclude that there are losers 
and winners from economic integration. Yet what may be overlooked is that integration 
might provide mutual gains even though countries perform differently for whatever reason 
or even though the gains from integration are somewhat lopsided. Real convergence can be 
postponed by transfers as they lower the incentives for adjustment and innovation. But to 
call for transfers to overcome differences in regional economic development which tighten 
the status quo or even aggravate gaps in economic dynamics would be counterproductive. 
Witness the fate of Southern Italy. 
On the other hand, the notion of convergence must also not be pushed too far, for it 
draws on the perception of integration as an adjustment to equilibrium. However, the very 
notion of equilibrium is a static concept, which might not be very successfu1 in explaining 
market processes. Market processes can be much better grasped by the pictore of 
Schumpeterian competition, 47 since this allows for creativity which actually does not fit 
neatly into the disturbance-(ie. openness}-adjustment-equilibrium framework, because of its 
de-coordinating character. In an environment characterized by the permanent search for new 
opportunities and innovation it cannot be expected that the leader-follower pattern 
observable at a certain point of time should hold. This also applies for locational 
competition. Consequently, merely removing harriers to competition is by ,no means a 
guarantee for taking off; but also itnplies the risk of falling behind. That said, the latter is the 
very nature of competition. 
The higher the diffusion of know-how due to economic integration and the smaller the 
differences in endowment, the more we have to focus on competition in economic policy 
when it comes to catching up or falling behind. Looking at convergence as a goal to achieve 
and classifying everything else as a failure of economic integration would therefore be 
"misplaced concreteness"", neglecting the benefits from dynamic competition (including 
competition in economic policy) instead of pnre arbitrage. 
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NOTES 
1 For references see note 8, 
, See, for instance, BARRO and SALA-l-MARTIN (1991) and (1992). and SALA-l-MARTIN (1994). 
3 See. for instance, EC COMMISSION (1990) and BEGG and MAYES (1993). 
Although the US is much larger, not in economic weight. but on a geographical scale. Differences are 
also pointed out by CUADRADO. DEHESA and PRECEDO (1993). p. 266. 
, Among those who are of the opinion that real adjustment problems in the US are cushioned much more 
than in Europe because of fiscal federalism is, for instance, EICHENGREEN (199O), See also the 
caJculations by SACHS and SALA·I-MARTIN (1992), who come to the conclusion that in the US almost 
40 per cent of the impact of regional shocks is absorbed via vertical flows between the different levels of 
government. 
For some empirical evidence see BLANCHARD and KATZ (1992). 
On this subject see OHLIN (1933) as well as the two classic papers by SAMUELSON (1948). (1949). 
HQ\'YeVef. the proponents of the traditional approach were well aware of the possibility of economic 
integration being detrimental to real incomes earned in case the (short-run) elasticity of factors of 
production should be low. Moreover, by implicitly focussing on multilateral free trade, the approach 
labelled here as "traditional" disregards the issue of trade diversion and trade creation which can give 
rise to a setback. in regional economic development. Yet, in this framework. there is no reason to assume 
that the loss in economic activity win systematically fall on newcomers being relatively backward 
• See AR11lUR (1990) as well as DAVID and ROSENBLOOM (1990) and KRUGMAN and VENABLES 
(1990). However, the issue of location in the presence of economies of scale is not a new one in economic 
theory. as the _k of MARSHALL (1920). LOSCH (1943/1%2), GIERSCH (1949) and KALDOR 
(1970). (1972) shows. But see also YOUNG (1928). who can be considered as a forerunner of the 
imperfect-(strategic}competition-models which became fashionable in the eighties. 
9 Proponents of the divergence hypothesis are well aware of the fact that being close to the market need 
not imply that producers located at the periphery cannot acquire new markets, but are out-competed by 
producers located at the center. This is evident in all those cases in which innovation, the production 
technique or regional endowments make up for transportation costs. Aside from that, though. there is not 
much of a gain to be eqJected from economic integration. 
10 However, there are also models in which they are internalized. In this case the dynamics enter the picture 
via the market structure, namely oligopoly (see GROSSMAN and HELPMAN (199111995) or AGI·nON 
and HOWITT (1992». or via financial market imperfections (GREENWALD. KOlIN and STlGLm 
1990). STOLPE (1992) provides an overview. For a more critical view on the notion of divergence see 
BARRO and SALA-l-MARTIN (1991) as well as SALA-I-MARTIN (1994). 
11 See YANG (1994). YANG. however. draws a distinction between economies of scale and economies of 
specia1i23tion. which does not allow for him being subsumed under the economies-of-scale strand 
" See MYRDAL (1957). NURKSE (1953) and ROSENSTEIN-RODAN (1943). 
1) See, for instance, the arguments put forward by the Delors-Report (CEC (1989), p. 22). 
14 See SUGDEN (1986) for this and similar examples of coordination games . 
., Although the question of economies of scale in transportation itself has been touched upon, the dynamics 
in relative costs has not received the attention in development debates it deserves. KRUGMAN (1993), 
for instance, handles the static issue of economi,es of scale in transportation, arriving at a hub and spoke 
pattern. KRUGMAN and VENABLES (1990) address the question of changes in transportation costs 
only whereas VON WEIZSACKER (1991). although focussing on telecommunications in particu1ar, has 
obviously the dynamics of relative costs in mind 
16 The term "ability to sell" has been coined by BALASSA (1964). 
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11 For a more detailed discussion of this issue see DLUHOSCH, FREYTAG and KROGER 
( 19921forthcoming). 
18 Whether economies of scale are really so prevalent that they cover the whole European market might be 
called into question since preferences are also quite diiIerent. Product differentiation, however, by 
increasing marginal costs, all but works in the other direction. 
19 On Intra-European labor mobility see, for instance, FAINI and VEN1URINI (1994). The fact. that 
migration has so far been minor is not as acknowledged as is should be. Although. for instance, 
DEHESA and KRUGMAN (1992) admit that "the story is complicated somewhat by labor immobility, 
which will not change in the near future ... " and that " ... reducing the barriers to trade within the EC may 
make it more attractive to produce in low-wage locations," they simply move on by saying "however, 
matters are not that simple, because reduced barriers to trade also make it more profitable to concentrate 
production in a few locations to achieve economies of scale - and as long as there remain significant 
costs of transportation and transaction costs across space, these concentrations may be chosen for market 
access rather than low cost . ... " If they were right. production should be much more concentrated than is 
currently observed. But they offer no explanation for the question of why economic activity is not even 
more regionally concentrated nowadays (or why it was not more concentrated during the heyday of mass 
production and huge international capital flows, namely the late 19th century) nor do they draw any 
conclusions from the fact that labor is all but mobile within the EU. 
20 If a situation like this should ever be faced, there "\oIIOUld be no need for the center to draw on 
international integration to set the expansionary process in motion. The economy could be steered 
towards more economic activity by national fiscal policy cum monetary accommodation alone. Moreover, 
an increase in net exports of the center implies an increase in net capital exports. The latter, however, 
would foster economic activity in the periphery, especially in the non-tradeables sector. 
21 SAY (1836). For an up-tCHiate discussion see SOWELL (1994). For an application to international issues 
see DLUHOSCH, FREYTAG and KROGER (1992Jforthcoming) and the references cited therein. 
2> On tenos oftnlde in a dynamic setting see CORDEN (1994), pp. 271-279. 
23 VINALS (1992) gives a detailed description of the status quo ante with regard to openness and the 
structure of trade. 
24 For a description of the development of the main economic indicators during the period of high net 
capital imports see SCHADLER (1993) and LOPEZ-CLAROS (1988). For a more long-tenn perspective 
see VINALS (1992). 
v On this point see vrNALS et aI. (1990). Right before entering the EU (1985), net exports vis-a.-vis the 
EU showed still a positive sign (39 bill. Ptas), whereas deficits concentrated on the trade with Japan (-
116 bill. Pts.). VINALS (1992) provides an overview. See especially table 3. 
26 The objection to using real exchange rates as an indicator of price competitiveness, because they also 
reflect changes in prices of services which might not convey information about the competitive position 
of the international sector, applies only partially. For, if relative prices change due to diiIerences of 
movements in non-tradeables, the intersectoral allocation of resources wilt be modified too (as long as 
markets are penneable to factor movements). Thus, the change in relative prices of tradeables and non­
tradeables does also alter the competitive position of suppliers of tradeables. 
" See BURNS (1994). 
21 That changes in real exchange rates jeopardized the international competitiveness of the Spartish 
economy is, for instance, pointed out by ALZOLA (1992). 
29 For a discussion of problems of calculation and interpretation see, for instance, LIPSCHITZ and 
MCDONALD (1992), TURNER and VAN D'TACK (1993) and MARSH and TOKARICK (1994). 
30 On the role of real exchange rates in the adjustment process see MEYER (1938) and SAMUELSON 
(1980). 
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31 This can also be seen by comparing different real exchange rates, since real exchange rates based on 
export unit values increase by less than those which include a higher portion of non-tradeables. 
3l On the external constraints faced by macroeconomic policy in the second half of the eighties see 
OOLADO and vrNALS (1990). On sectoral price movements due to the easing of monetary p>licy see 
PUJOL (1993). 
33 See ALZOLA (1992), p. 34. 
" See GAL Y (1993), p. 7. 
3' Although the movement of the exchange rate looks similar to the one in the overshooting debate, it has to 
be pointed out that the forces behind the exchange rate movement are quite different. Por a detailed 
analysis see DLUHOSCH, FREYTAG and KROGER (1992/forthooming). The overshooting model as 
developed by DORNBUSCH (1976) can only explain small changes in exchange rates. See HOMBURG 
(1989) for a discussion and some back-of-the-envelope calculations. Moreover, this is not to be mixed up 
either with the tendency for real appreciation in the process of catching up due to differences in changes 
in productivity in the tradeables sector and the services sector as discussed by BALASSA (1964b). 
36 See OR'IEGA et al. (1990), p. 198, for the data By undertaking a econometric examination OOLADO 
and VINALS (1990, 1'1'. 330-333) came to the conclusion that the real appreciation was indeed mainly 
due to the influx of capital thus indicating an equilibrium phenomenon. 
37 On the evolution ofproductivity and employment see PENALOSA (1994). 
3a See SCHADLER et al. (1993), table 4, p. 11, for an overview. 
" See table 23 in VINALS (1992). 
40 For the history of Ponzi-games see KlNDLEBERGER (1989), for Ponzi-games with special reference to 
government finances see DLUHOSCH (1993) and the references cited therein. 
41 See OOLADO and VINALS (1990), p. 309, for a compilation of data 
42 For a more detailed discussion of Spanish monetary perfonnance in the eighties see also DLUHOSCH 
and KROGER (1991). 
" Por figures see BAJO and TORRES (1992), p. 199, VINALS (1992), p. 63, as ...,l1 as DOLADO and 
VINALS (1990), p. 306. 
44 On this issue see ESTEBAN (1994) and PENALOSA (1994). For differences in evaluation see 
BLANCHARD and JIMENO (1994) as ...,11 as DIAZ-GIMENEZ and SEBASTIAN (1994) and 
VITZIHUM (1994). 
4' See VINALS (1994), 1'1'. 12-14, for more statistical details. That the slide of the economy in the period 
1914-84 was mainly due to structural factors (e.g. labor market rigidities and economic policy reluctant 
to change course) has been Pointed out by DOLADO and VINALS (1990), p. 306. 
46 If Spanish firms are out-competed because of local markets being smaller, the Grubel-Lloyd index 
measuring the significance of intra-industry trade should be especially low vis-a-vis the EU. As the 
traditional theory would predict, intra-industry trade already made for a significant element in Spanish 
trade with the rest of the EU member states at the point of departure, reaching at least 44 per cent in 
1985 (26 per cent vis-a-vis all others). Yet, the index indicates that intra-industry trade even widened in 
the aftermath of Spain's entry in the EU, climbing to 54 per cent in 1990 (33 per cent vis-a-vis all 
othen;). See MARTIN (1992) and V1NALS (1992), p. 26 and 81. 
47 See SCHUMPETER (1949). For a detailed critique of the very notion of equilibrium see also 
MORGENS11!RN (I %3), pp. 42-70 . 
.. MACHLUP (1967/1991). 
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